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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Case No. 920444-CA

vs.
MICHAEL R. LeVASSEUR,
Defendant-Appellant.

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal by
virtue of the provisions of §78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated
(1953) as amended.
ISSUES
1.

Whether the appellant was entrapped to commit the

offense for which he was convicted.

The standard of review is

that if reasonable minds acting fairly on the evidence of entrapment should necessarily have a reasonable doubt as to the Appellant's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.

State v. Kourbelas,

621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980).
2.

Whether Rule 608(b) of the Rules of Evidence pro-

hibits the testimony of a witness that an undercover police officer
used illegal drugs during the time she was investigating Appellant,
where the officer had testified on cross-examination that she did
not use illegal drugs during that time.

The standard of review is

whether the trial court's ruling excluding this evidence constituted error affecting a substantial right of Appellant.

Utah

Rule of Evidence 103(a); State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App.
1990) n.l at 821.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Const, art. I, §7: No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
Utah Const, art. I, §12: In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases . . . .
STATUTES
§76-2-303(1), Utah Code Annotated (1953): It
is a defense that the actor was entrapped into
committing the offense. Entrapment occurs
when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in cooperation with the
officer induces the commission of an offense
in order to obtain evidence of the commission
for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit
it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.

RULES
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 608 (b): Specific
instances of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of a crime as
provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. . • •
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction based
on a jury verdict finding Appellant guilty of one count of distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in
violation of §58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below
Appellant was charged with two counts of distributing
cocaine.

At a pretrial hearing on Appellant's assertion of the

defense of entrapment, the trial judge ruled that, as a matter of
law, Appellant was not entrapped into commission of the offenses
(R. 45). The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict
of guilty as to one count; the jury was hung as to the other count,
as to which a mistrial was declared
was initially

(R. 76, T. 203). Appellant

committed to the Department of Corrections for a

diagnostic evaluation (R. 115), and was thereafter sentenced to
the statutory prison term.

Appellant was placed on probation on

conditions including hospitalization, jail sentence and fine (R.
126).

This appeal followed.

Statement of Facts
I.

The Police Conduct

In the month of November of 1990, Anne Burchett, an
undercover police officer working for the Iron/Beaver County Narcotics Task Force, met the Appellant Mike LeVasseur when she went
into the bar where he worked in Cedar City (T.

62) . Agent Bur-

chett's purpose in going into the bar was to befriend people in
order to obtain drugs from them, either through purchase or gift
(T. 81). Although she had no conversation with Mike during this
first visit, she returned to the bar in May, 1991, and, by this
time, Mike had been identified to her as a drug "target" (T. 88).
She thus went into the bar this second time with a specific purpose to try to get drugs or information from the Appellant (T. 88).
At this second meeting the two struck up a conversation, and made
a date for dinner together at a local restaurant on May 8 or 9
(T. 63, 89). This dinner together was the beginning of an exclusive dating arrangement between the officer and the Appellant
(T. 100, 163) .
In the weeks following the dinner date, agent Burchett
began visiting Mike at the bar two or three times a week (T. 155).
They went for a motorcycle ride together, to a movie and to lunch
(T. 63), and, some time prior to May 24, 1991, they went together
to a party at a friend's cabin at Panguitch Lake.

After drinking

and playing strip poker until 2:00 or 3:00 a.m., Agent Burchett
and Appellant retired alone to a downstairs bedroom, where they
spent the night together (T. 64). Although they kissed during this

evening, and although agent Burchett and Appellant slept together
in the same bed, they did not have sexual intercourse.

Agent

Burchett explained to Appellant that she had just gotten divorced
and didn't want to seem like a tramp, and therefore she didn't
want to have sex with him (T. 167).
Before May 24, 1991, Burchett had told Appellant that
she was a cocaine user (T. 123) , and on that date she went to the
bar around 6:00 p.m. (T. 66). Later in the evening, Appellant,
using a gesture Burchett understood to mean cocaine, said, "Do
you want some?" (T. 67). Agent Burchett said, "Yeah"

(T. 68),

and Appellant handed her a folded dollar bill, which she took to
the bathroom.

There, she unfolded the bill, removed a part of the

small quantity of cocaine therein, secured the sample and returned
the bill to Appellant (T. 68). Later that evening, Appellant,
having been informed by Burchett that she hadn't used all of the
cocaine he gave her earlier, again handed her the bill.

She again

went to the bathroom, removed the rest of the small quantity of
cocaine, and returned the empty bill to Appellant (T. 69).
During the months of May and June, 1991, Burchett and
Appellant continued their relationshipf

She visited him often at

the bar where he worked (T. 74), frequently taking him home-cooked
dinners while he was working (T. 94). On at least one occasion
she invited him to her home for dinner (T.93).

Appellant and his

brother went to her home to fix her porch and mow her lawn, and
she thanked him by sending him flowers (T. 94). He sometimes

drove her car and his brother drove her truck (T. 99). She testified at trial that she was cultivating her friendship with Appellant in order to get him to give her drugs (T. 114). She
even cultivated a friendship with Appellant's mother, accompanying
her to a movie (T. 111) and taking her a home-cooked dinner at her
place of work once or twice (T. 94).
Some time during the month of June, 1991, Appellant
visited Burchett at Brian Head, where she worked as a cocktail
waitress (T.73).

Before she finished work, she invited Appellant

to stay with her that night in a hotel room of Jeff 5*arr, a friend
of hers who also worked at Brian Head (T.

95). Appellant took a

friend home, then went to Burchett's hotel room, where she greeted
him at the door wearing only a long shirt and panties (T. 97). They
again slept the night in the same bed, although they did not engage
in sexual intercourse (T. 73).
On June 20, 1991 Burchett was again visiting Appellant
at the bar where he was working (T. 74) when he again offered her
a small dose of cocaine.

She took the cocaine to the restroom and

removed a small sample (T. 75), later turning it in as evidence.
After this second incident, Appellant heard little from
Burchett (T. 165) until August 28, 1992, when she phoned him at
his work, saying they "had to talk" (T. 162). By this time Appellant had learned that Burchett was a police officer (T. 162), but
agreed to meet her at his work the following day.

She never came.

II.

The Disputed Trial Testimony

On cross-examination, Agent Burchett testified that
she never used illegal drugs while working undercover in Iron
County (T. 102). The defense produced a witness, Jeff Farr, who
was prepared to testify that Burchett used illegal drugs on several
occasions during the time she was working undercover for the Iron/
Beaver County Narcotics Task Force (T. 149) . Although the prosecutor did not object to this testimony (T. 150) , the trial judge
ruled sua sponte that the proferred testimony of Jeff Farr was
prohibited by Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (T. 150).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The conduct of Officer Anne Burchett induced the

Appellant to give her drugs, and was entrapment within the meaning
of §76-2-303(1), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as enacted by Laws,
1973.

The evidence establishes as a matter of law that Anne Bur-

chett induced the commission of the offenses by methods creating a
substantial risk that the offenses would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit them.

The trial court erred in denying

Appellant's motion to dismiss both counts on the ground that he was
entrapped.

Reasonable minds acting fairly on the evidence should

necessarily have a reasonable doubt as to Appellant's guilt on
Count II of the Information, and the jury's verdict should be
overturned.
2.

The trial judge incorrectly excluded the testimony

of defense witness Jeff Farr under Rule 608 (b).

His testimony was

admissible as impeachment of Agent Anne Burchett, and was material
to the central issue of the propriety of the agentfs conduct.

The

exclusion of Farr's testimony was a denial of Appellant's right to
due process and to present witnesses in his defense, in violation
of Utah Const, art. I, §7 and §12.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE POLICE CONDUCT INDUCING APPELLANT TO DISTRIBUTE
DRUGS TO AGENT ANNE BURCHETT WAS ENTRAPMENT.
The defense of entrapment set forth in Utah Code Ann.

§76-2-303(1) (1977) embodies an objective standard, focusing the
inquiry on the conduct of the police:
"Under the objective view of entrapment,
the focus is not on the propensities
and predisposition of the specific defendant, but on whether the police conduct falls below standards to which
common feelings respond, for the proper use of government power. This concept establishes entrapment on its historical basis, the refusal to countenance a perversion of justice by governmental misconduct. The objective
view provides a solid definitive
standard upon which the defense can
rest, i.e., does the conduct of the
government comport with a fair and
honorable administration of justice?"
State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah
1979) at 500.
In each case the propriety of the inducement by the
police is measured by its probable effect on a hypothetical person in the setting in which the inducement took place. State v.

Wright, 744 P.2d 315 (Utah App. 1987).

Every case in which the

defense is raised must be carefully examined on its own facts,
State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 667 (Utah App. 1988), and the Utah Supreme Court has suggested that the very circumstances in this case
may go beyond the proper use of the government's power:
"Extreme pleas of desperate illness or
appeal based primarily on sympathy,
pity, or close personal friendship, or
offers of inordinate sums of money,
are examples, depending on an evaluation
of the circumstances in each case, of
what might constitute prohibited police conduct. In evaluating the course
of conduct between the government representative and the defendant, the
transactions leading up to the offense,
the interaction between the agent and
the defendant, and the response to the
inducements of the agent, are all to
be considered in judging what the effect of the government agent's conduct
would be on a normal person. Taylor,
599 P.2d at 503 (emphasis added).
Although the prosecutor made much of the fact that
Anne Burchett never actually asked Appellant for the cocaine
(T.

175) , claiming that she therefore never induced him to com-

mit the offensesf it is clear from the facts that her entire
course of conduct toward Appellant induced him to give her the
drugs.

Indeed, her stated purpose was to cultivate her friend-

ship with him to get him to give her drugs (T. 114) . And this
relationship went far beyond ordinary friendship; by her own
description Anne Burchett and Appellant were dating (T. 63), and
were not dating other people (T. 100, 163). By the time Appellant

first gave her cocaine on May 24, 1991, he and Burchett had gone
to dinner at a restaurant, ridden together on his motorcycle,
seen a movie and gone to lunch together (T. 63). She had visited
him

several times at his place of work (T. 155) , and had gone

with him to a party at Panguitch Lake, where they, along with
others, played strip poker.

They slept together alone in the

same bed (T. 64), and he had kissed her.

She had told him she

was a cocaine user (T. 123) , and she had identified him as a
"target" for drugs (T. 88). This conduct on Burchett's part
was specifically intended by her to induce Appellant to give her
drugs, and it was successful.
Even though the evidence in this case does not involve
the intimate sexual relationships dealt with in State v. Taylor,
599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979) and State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah
1975) , the relationship between Burchett and Appellant was significantly more intimate than the one disapproved in State v. Kaufman,
734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987).

In holding that the defendant had been

entrapped by the actions of an attractive female police officer,
the Kaufman court observed:
"Clearly, the defendant saw more in her
than a business relationship. Why didn't
the police send in a male officer? Or
an unattractive female police officer?
The answer is clear from the relationship
which developed." 734 P.2d at 468.
In the Kaufman case

the mere expectation by the defendant that

his relationship with the female officer might become more inti-

mate was deemed significant by the court in ruling that the officer had entrapped him; in the case now before this Court the
defendant's expectations had gone nearly to the ultimate fruition
of complete sexual intimacy.
This case must be distinguished from State v. Wynia,
754 P.2d 667 (Utah App. 1988), in which two undercover female
officers had only two contacts with the defendant, each occasion
resulting in the defendant's sale of drugs to the agents.

These

meetings were in a public bowling alley/lounge and in a second
lounge, and, except for an agent buying the defendant drinks, nothing else other than the drug transactions ever took place between the agents and the defendant.

This Court found no entrapment,

ruling that the police conduct was consistent with the fair and
honorable administration of justice. 754 P.2d at 670. Appellant's
relationship with Anne Burchett, however, had progressed far beyond the superficial

contacts approved in Wynia.

By the time

the first drug transaction took place, the two had spent many hours
alone together in an unmistakably romantic liason.
In this case the State has suggested that because Burchett never had sexual intercourse with Appellant, her conduct
cannot be condemned (T. 176, 191)f emphasizing the necessity for
an undercover agent to gain the confidence of a potential offender.
But the agent's conduct in this case went far beyond gaining Appellant's confidence.

The social aspects of the relationship are

at the core of the entrapment defense, and the State cannot distance itself from the consequences of Burchett's behavior:

"The government, once employing an
undercover agent, cannot choose to
select those actions of the informer which are beneficial to its
case, and refuse to be responsible
for the total conduct of its agent
while engaged in the deception."
State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 751
(Utah 1975) (Maughan, J. dissenting)
(emphasis added)•
It is notable that the views of Justice Maughan dissenting in
Curtis became the law of this state in the Supreme Court's next
entrapment decision, State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979).
Anne Burchett's total conduct falls far below the
"proper use of governmental power," Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369, 382 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

She clearly

"capitalized on a special relationship," State v. Wright, 744 P.
2d 315, 319 (Utah App. 1987), appealing to the intimate friendship
she had established with the Appellant.

Such police behavior

must not be tolerated in an advanced society.

Taylor, supra,

at 502.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS JEFF FARR.
I.

Statutory and Decisional Law

The trial judge, without any prosecution objection
to the testimony of defense witness Jeff Farr, ruled that his testimony was inadmissible as a "specific instance of the conduct" of
agent Anne Burchett and therefore unprovable by extrinsic evidence

according to the prohibition of Utah Rule of Evidence 608 (b).
Since the witness Anne Burchett had denied in her trial testimony that she had used illegal drugs during the time she was investigating Appellant's cases, Jeff Farr's proferred testimony
that he had personally observed Burchett to use illegal drugs during that time was a direct impeachment of Burchett.

Even if

his testimony was otherwise prohibited by Rule 608(b), it was
nonetheless admissible impeachment:
"In accordance with Rule 608, Utah
courts have consistently held that
impeachment evidence is admissible
if it goes to credibility, even
though it introduces evidence which
would otherwise be inadmissible."
State v. Reed, 820 P.2d 479, 481
(Utah App. 1991).
In Reed, the defendant had testified that he had told a witness
that he did not use drugs.

This Court approved the prosecutor's

subsequent inquiry of both the defendant and a third witness
about drug paraphernalia found at the defendant's housef observing that credibility was a crucial issue; first, the defendant's
testimony had directly attacked the character of another witness.
Second, the defendant's testimony directly contradicted that of
another witness.

Third, the defendant had denied the use of drugs,

and this Court ruled that inquiring into the presence of drug paraphernalia in his house was permissible impeachment. 820 P.2d
at 481.
This case is factually identical to Reed.

Burchett had

testified that she did not use illegal drugs during her undercover
assignment, and Farr's testimony had a direct bearing on her credibility on that point.

In addition, in this case, the entire

behavior of the police was the only issue before the jury, and
Farr's testimony was monumentally important to that inquiry.
His evidence was clearly more than the general attack on credibility prohibited by Rule 608(b), State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d
200 (Utah 1987) , and was improperly excluded by the trial judge.
The error affected the substantial right of Appellant to present
his defense of entrapment, the only defense he offered, and was
therefore reversible, Utah R. Evid. 103(a), a proffer of the substance of Farr's testimony having been made on the trial record
(T. 149).
II.

Constitutional Basis

The trial court's exclusion of the testimony of defense
witness Jeff Farr prevented Appellant from presenting his only
witness other than himself.

Farr's testimony had a direct bearing

on the credibility of the undercover agent as well as upon the
propriety of the police conduct in this case, the very issue raised
by Appellant's entrapment defense.

Appellant was thus deprived of

his fundamental right to present a witness in his defense, and
the deprivation was of constitutional dimensions.

Although the

Utah Supreme Court has held that the violation of an evidentiary
standard is not in every case a constitutional deprivation, State
v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 205 (Utah 1987), this Court is urged
so to hold in this case.

A.

Due Process

An early Utah case dealing with Art. I, §7 of our
state Constitution observed:
"Many attempts have been made to further
define 'due process' but they all resolve into the thought that a party
shall have his day in court —
that is
each party shall have the right to a
hearing before a competent court, with
the privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his cause
or defense, after which comes judgment
upon the record thus made." Christiansen
v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945).
In the circumstances of this case the language of Christiansen
is directly pertinent.

Because Jeff Farr was the only defense

witness other than the Appellant himself and hostile police officers, and because his testimony had a direct bearing on the
credibility of the state's principal witness and upon the propriety of the conduct of the police, his exclusion prevented
Appellant from having his "day in court," and denied him the
"privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish"
his defense.

The error in excluding Farr's testimony was there-

fore a denial of Appellant's right to due process guaranteed by
Utah Const, art. I, §7.
B.

Right to Present Witnesses

The language of Utah Const, art. I, §12 includes the
right of the accused "to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf . . . "

Implicit in

this language is the right to present the testimony of such
witnesses at trial.

No Utah case has dealt with this construction

of our Constitution, but the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has
recognized the right of a defendant to present witnesses in his
defense as being anchored in a Maryland Constitutional provision
similar to ours.

In Brooks v. State, 560 A.2d 56 (Md. App. 1989),

the court held that the trial court's erroneous exclusion of a
defense witness who would have testified in a DUI case that the
defendant was not driving the car amounted to a violation of the
defendant's right under Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights to "present witnesses in his defense."

560 A.2d at 59.

Article 21 of the Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights
guarantees criminal defendants the right "to have process for his
witnesses; to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath
..."

The identical right to present witnesses is inherent in

Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution.

This Court should hold

that this right cannot be abrogated by a statutory rule of evidence
nor by the erroneous application of such a rule as occurred here.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant was entrapped into commission of the
offenses for which he was charged, and this Court should hold
that, as a matter of law, the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss both counts was reversible error.

The jury's

verdict of guilty should be reversed as to Count II of the Information, because reasonable minds must have a reasonable doubt

that Appellant was not entrapped.

If this Court does not reverse

on the entrapment issue it should hold that the exclusion of the
testimony of defense witness Jeff Farr was error affecting the
substantial right of Appellant to present his defense, both as a
matter of statutory construction, as well as under the Constitution
of the State of Utahf and remand the case for a new trial.
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